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Abstract
This paper makes a correction to the way the marginal social cost of public funds (MCF) is used in
Sieper (1981) to obtain uncompensated shadow prices when transfers are made with distorting taxes. 
We derive a shadow value of government revenue to measure the change in utility from endowing an
extra dollar of revenue on the government who transfers it to consumers.  This, rather than the
“conventional” Harberger” measure of the MCF, converts the compensated shadow price of any good
into its uncompensated shadow price.  We use it to prove that Ramsey optimal taxes, which minimize
the compensated tax inefficiency for a given revenue requirement, have equal uncompensated
marginal excess burdens per dollar change in government revenue.
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  The conventional measure of the MCF is attributed to Harberger, and is the welfare1
change isolated by lump-sum transfers.
  We show below that the MCF is a component of the shadow value of government2
revenue.  When a dollar of revenue is endowed on the government it uses distorting taxes to
balance its budget.  Each resulting dollar transferred to the private economy, which will in general
be different from one dollar due to endogenous changes in government revenue, raises utility by the
MCF.
  All the partial derivatives are those isolated by lump-sum transfers.  When “actual”3
lump-sum transfers are ruled out, we use “notional” lump-sum transfers.
  Sieper refers to this shadow value of government revenue as the MCF.  It will be argued4
below that this is not consistent with the “conventional” Harberger measure of the MCF which is
unity for lump-sum transfers.  A hat over a variable denotes a compensated change.  All other
changes are uncompensated.
1
1.  Introduction
When a “conventional” cost-benefit analysis is used to evaluate public sector projects the
welfare effects of their separate components are isolated by lump-sum transfers. 
Harberger (1968) exploited this property to compute the shadow prices of the individual
inputs and outputs for each project.  These prices provide a way of measuring how
projects impact on social welfare.  In practice, however, transfers are rarely made as a
lump-sum, but rather with distorting taxes, and this introduces tax inefficiency that
changes the shadow prices.  In an important contribution to applied welfare analysis
Sieper (1981) derives “implementation-problem corrected” (hereafter “corrected”)
shadow prices as “conventional” Harberger shadow prices plus the change in tax
inefficiency on any notional lump-sum transfers.
As a part of the analysis, Sieper examines the relationship between the compensated and
uncompensated shadow prices of goods, and argues that with distorting taxes, they are
linked together by the conventionally measured marginal social cost of public funds
(MCF).   In particular, it is claimed the uncompensated shadow price of any good is equal1
to its compensated shadow price multiplied by the MCF.  We prove, however, that this is
incorrect.  Instead, the shadow prices are linked together by the shadow value of
government revenue, which is the change in utility when a dollar of revenue is endowed
on the government.  After all, the compensated shadow price is the extra revenue that a
good will endow on the government at unchanged private utility.  We cannot use the MCF
to convert these dollars into utility because it doesn’t capture the value of additional
government revenue.2
To see why this correction is necessary we begin by considering the way “conventional”
shadow prices are computed when lump-sum transfers are possible.  The “conventional”
uncompensated shadow price of any good k is equal to:3
,
where  is the producer price of the good, and  the induced change in government
revenue i.e, the “tax-revenue effect”.  Sieper proves that this is equal to the compensated
shadow price, , multiplied by the “conventional” shadow value of government revenue,
.   The compensated price isolates the potential welfare gain.  When this gain is4
transferred lump-sum to consumers each dollar raises utility by , so the final change in
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  This follows from the fact that all the taxes are specific so the induced price changes in5
home goods markets do not affect the size of any tax wedges.  In the absence of public production,
changes in consumer surplus would be exactly offset by the changes in producer surplus.  All
traded goods prices are unchanged because the economy is small in world markets, and the official
exchange rate is fixed.
  Sieper obtains the “corrected” compensated shadow price by directly solving the welfare6
change for  in the compensated equilibrium.  When this is multiplied by , and not  as
claimed by Sieper, we obtain the “corrected” uncompensated shadow price.  It is argued here that it
is incorrect to claim .
2
utility is the uncompensated shadow price:
,
where the terms inside the brackets are .
Both shadow prices change when transfers are made with distorting taxes, and the
“corrected” uncompensated shadow price becomes:
,
where  is the “conventional” MCF.  The first term, , is the change in profits
on public production (i.e., the “profit effect”) and it represents the excess of the fall in
consumer surplus over the increase in producer surplus when home goods prices rise.  5
The second term is the change in utility when the budget surplus is transferred to
consumers with distorting taxes; this surplus arises from the “sales revenue”, , plus the
“tax-revenue” and “profit effects”.  Clearly, when taxes are non-distorting the MCF will
be unity (with ), and this “corrected” shadow price collapses to the “conventional”
shadow price above.  Sieper rearranges  as:
,
and claims the terms inside the square brackets represent the “corrected” compensated
shadow price, .  We prove below that this is incorrect, and claim instead that:
,
where  is the “corrected” shadow value of government revenue.  Now the terms
inside the square brackets are , with .   The difference between the6
“conventional” MCF, , and the shadow value of government revenue, , is captured
by the reduced form expression:
.
The first term is the direct impact on utility of endowing an extra dollar of revenue on the
government, and the second the change in utility at rate  on dollars transferred to
consumers to balance the government budget.  It is clear that the final transfers to
consumers (in brackets) will differ from the initial dollar endowed on the economy when
there are endogenous changes in government revenue.  Thus,  when there are no
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  Sieper conjectures , but obtains a reduced form expression for  on page 507
which is not consistent with the structural form expression obtained in Proposition 17 on pages 61-
62.  (We prove below that the reduced form expression is for , while the structural form
expression is for .)  In fact, the excellent discussion on pages 60-61 for the derivation of the
structural form expression is entirely consistent with the reduced form expression for  above.
  Sieper (1994) refers to  as the normalised MEB of taxation; it is the compensated8
change in the government budget surplus per dollar change in the compensating transfers for a
marginal increase in tax h.
3
endogenous changes in government revenue, but not in general otherwise.7
Additional insight is obtained by noting the MCF is equal to , where  is the
marginal excess burden of taxation (MEB) per dollar change in government i.e., the
normalised MEB.  This allows us to write the shadow value of government revenue
above, as:
.
The first two terms are the “conventional” shadow value of government revenue; they
measure the change in utility when a dollar is endowed on the government who balances
its budget with lump-sum transfers.  The last term is the change in tax inefficiency when
the notional lump-sum transfers are made with distorting taxes.
Having derived  we then use it to demonstrate the somewhat surprising proposition
that Ramsey optimal taxes, which minimize the compensated tax inefficiency for a given
revenue requirement, have the same uncompensated tax inefficiency per dollar change in
government revenue.  This follows from the relationship between the uncompensated
normalised MEB for any tax h, , and its compensated measure, , where:
.
8
This is another example of the way the shadow value of government revenue isolates the
income effects that link together compensated and uncompensated welfare changes; in
this case the marginal excess burdens.  If we take the ratio of the normalised MEB’s for
any two taxes h and m, we have:
.
When , the shadow value of government revenue, , is independent of the tax
used because each tax converts dollars of surplus into the same change in utility.  Under
these circumstances we have .  This result, together with the observation by Sieper
that the ratio of the uncompensated shadow prices for any two goods is equal to the ratio
of their compensated shadow prices, means that project evaluation can proceed using
welfare changes computed in full equilibrium models.  All the income effects that link
together the compensated and uncompensated welfare changes are independent of the
goods and taxes being evaluated, so they disappear when we take the ratio of the
uncompensated welfare changes.
The paper commences in the next section by deriving reduced form expressions for the
“conventional” MCF and the “corrected” shadow value of government revenue.  In
section 3 we prove the structural form expression for the MCF in Sieper on page 62 is in
fact the “corrected” shadow value of government revenue, and not the “conventional”
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  See Appendix A.1 for a summary of the model in Sieper and the derivation of equations9
(1), (2) and (3).
  In a compensated equilibrium the lump-sum transfers hold utility constant in equation10
(1) (with ), and the “conventional” welfare equation is obtained by substituting these
transfers into equation (2).  Now the welfare effects are equal to changes in the government budget
surplus.
4
MCF as conjectured on page 50.  Then in section 4 we prove that Ramsey optimal taxes
have the same uncompensated MEB per dollar change in government revenue. The paper
concludes in section 5 with a brief summary of the main findings.
2.  Reduced Form Shadow Pricing Rules
We use the general equilibrium model and notation in Sieper for a small open economy. 
From the private sector budget constraint, together with the first order conditions in
competitive markets, we obtain a dollar measure of the change in utility of:9
(1)  .
In essence, the terms in (1) are changes in consumer surplus.  Using the government
budget constraint, any change in the budget surplus is determined by:
(2)  ,
and the “tax-revenue effects” by:
(3)  .
To proceed with a “conventional” Harberger analysis we use lump-sum transfers to
balance the government budget in equation (2) (with dZ = 0), and then obtain the
“conventional” welfare equation by substituting these transfers directly into (1), where:10
(4)  .
2.1 “Conventional” Uncompensated Shadow Prices
Using (4), the “conventional” uncompensated shadow price of any good k, is:
(5)  .
It is the “sales revenue” collected by the government when it sells the unit of good k, plus
the “tax-revenue effect”.
2.2  “Corrected” Uncompensated Shadow Prices
When the government balances its budget with distorting taxes we can proceed with a
Harberger analysis by using notional lump-sum transfers, and then offsetting them with
adjustments to distorting taxes.  By doing this we obtain “corrected” shadow prices for
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  In the analysis that follows, all the partial derivatives are isolated by notional lump-sum11
transfers.
  It is proved in Proposition 6 below that when taxes are Ramsey optimal they have the12
same uncompensated inefficiency per dollar of transfer ( ).
5
goods that are their “conventional” shadow prices plus any tax inefficiency on transfers to
balance the government budget.  In the following derivations the production tax on home
good h is used to make these offsetting transfers.  Thus, we use the “conventional”
welfare equation in (4), and solve the tax change using equation (2) with  , where:11
(6)  .
Proposition 1: The “corrected” uncompensated shadow price of any good k, is:
(7)  ,
where:
(8)   is the normalised MEB; it is the “conventional” tax inefficiency
per dollar change in government revenue.  Following Sieper, we assume the taxes are
Ramsey optimal where this makes the normalised MEB the same for each tax.12
Proof:  When a unit of good k is endowed on the economy, the dollar change in utility is
equal to:
(9)  ,
where the tax change solves: ,
with:
(10)  .
Notice how the tax change generates notional lump-sum transfers to offset those arising
from the extra unit of good k.  After substituting (10) into (9), we have:
(11)  ,
which solves to equation (7) using the “conventional” shadow price in (5), and the
normalised MEB in (8).
The welfare changes in (7) are isolated by notional lump-sum transfers, so they are
conventional Harberger terms.  And the notional transfers arising from the impact of good
k on government revenue determine the amount of tax inefficiency in the “corrected”
sh
0L
0xk

 pk  M
iH
xi
0pi
0xk

0R
0xk
(Sk )D 
 pk 
0R
0xk
 d pk 
0R
0xk
 M
iH
xi
0pi
0xk
  Sieper isolates any tax inefficiency in the “corrected”  compensated shadow price in the13
same way.  In this setting, however, the notional lump-sum transfers hold utility constant, so the tax
inefficiency is defined per dollar change in compensating transfers rather than per dollar change in
government revenue.
  It is assumed tax revenue rises when tax  is raised marginally.14
6
shadow price because they must be made with distorting, rather than lump-sum, taxes.  13
From (6), they are:
(12)  ,
which is the “sales revenue” plus the “profit” and “tax-revenue effects”.  When
government revenue rises in (12), the distorting tax is lowered to reduce revenue by the
same amount.   In other words, the extra revenue is distributed by adjusting the14
production tax on good h to balance the government budget.  A reduction in the tax
inefficiency adds to the gain in utility captured by the “conventional” shadow price.  To
see this, substitute (12) into (7), where the “corrected” shadow price, becomes:
(13)  .
This is illustrated in Figure 1 for the home goods k and h where, for simplicity, we ignore
effects in related markets and assume there are no cross-effects between the markets for
the two goods.
Figure 1: The “Corrected” Shadow Price of Good k
When the government sells the additional unit of good k its market price will fall to
increase private demand and crowd-out private supply.  The “conventional” shadow price
is equal to areas (a)+(b)+(c), where (a)+(b) is the “sales revenue”, and (c) the “tax-
revenue effect”.  It is the combination of the direct gain in utility, (d)-(e) = (f), plus the
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  Area (f) is the fall in profits on public production of good k.  It therefore reduces15
government revenue.
  Area (w) is the rise in profit from public production of good h, but it is equal to the fall16
in tax revenue on that same output so it has no net impact on government revenue.
  This is the reduced form expression for the “conventional” MCF in Sieper on page 50,17
where: , with .  Notice that Sieper defines government
revenue as .
  This follows from  being a specific tax.18
  Area (w) is the rise in profit on public production of good h, and it is equal to the19
reduction in tax revenue on the same output.  Consequently, it has no impact on government
revenue.
7
lump-sum transfers to consumers to balance the government budget, (a)+(b)+(c)-(f).15
When these transfers are made by lowering tax  each dollar raises utility by the
normalised MEB; it is the tax inefficiency, (q), divided by the change in government
revenue, (u)+(v)-(q).   Under these circumstances, the “corrected” shadow price is the16
“conventional” shadow price, (a)+(b)+(c), plus the fall in tax inefficiency, (q), where:
.
2.3 The “Conventional” MCF
We obtain the “corrected” shadow price for good k derived by Sieper in Proposition 15 on
page 50 by adding and subtracting the “profit effect” to the “corrected” shadow price in
(13).  This yields:
(14)  ,
where:
(15)   is the “conventional” MCF; it is the direct cost to
utility per dollar change in government revenue when tax  is raised marginally.17
This derivation of  in (14) can also be illustrated in Figure 1 above.  The first term is
area (f); it is the amount by which the rise in consumer surplus in (d) exceeds the fall in
private producer surplus in (e), where (d)-(e)=(f).   The second term is the “conventional”18
MCF multiplied by the notional lump-sum transfers, (a)+(b)+(c)-(f); the “conventional”
MCF is the direct change in utility in (u)+(v), per dollar change in government revenue in
(u)+(v)-(q).   This makes the “corrected” shadow price in (14) equal to:19
.
It is clear that these two approaches must yield the same change in utility.  This is
confirmed by recalling the notional lump-sum transfers for  are offset by the notional
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  This is Proposition 4 on page 21 of Sieper.20
  The partial derivatives in (18) are:21
,
and .
8
lump-sum transfers for , where:
.
By adding (f) and (q) to both sides, we have:
.
2.4  The “Corrected” Shadow Value of Government Revenue
Sieper proves that, with lump-sum transfers, the uncompensated shadow price of any good
is equal to its compensated shadow price multiplied by the “conventional” shadow value
of government revenue, , where .   We now prove this same relationship for20
the “corrected” shadow prices, and by doing so, confirm the difference between the
“conventional” MCF, , and the “corrected” shadow value of government revenue, . 
This leads to:
Proposition 2:  The “corrected” uncompensated shadow price for any good k is:
(16)  ,
where:
(17)  , is the change in utility from endowing a dollar of
government revenue on the economy in the full equilibrium.
Proof:  Following Sieper write social welfare conditional on the public production vector
x and the government budget surplus Z, as , where the vector of taxes v are
endogenous and replace the (actual) lump-sum transfers.  The change in the government
budget surplus required to hold utility constant when good k is raised marginally is
defined by:
(18)  .21
From this, the “compensated” shadow price of good k becomes:
(19)  ,
where:
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  We use the transfer equation in (6), where: .22
  We use the notation in Sieper,23
where  measures the impact on the budget
surplus of a unit rise in real private spending, ,  and
.
9
(20)  .
This solves to the “corrected” shadow price in (17) using (4), where:
  , and (6) where: .22
By adding and subtracting the “profit effect”, , to (17), we have:
(21)  .
It is clear from (21) how the “conventional” MCF, , differs from the “corrected” shadow
value of government revenue, .
3.  Structural Form Shadow Pricing Rules
Sieper expresses the reduced form shadow pricing rules derived above in terms of the
structural form parameters.  These parameters determine how the economy adjusts to
exogenous changes in public production; a structural form expression for the
“conventional” uncompensated shadow price is obtained in Proposition 9, and the
“corrected” uncompensated shadow price in Proposition (18).  At no stage, however, does
Sieper derive a structural form expression for the MCF.  Instead, one is derived for ,
and the claim is made it is the MCF.  We now prove this is incorrect by deriving structural
form expressions for the MCF and  .
3.1 The “Conventional” MCF
Proposition 3: A structural form expression for the “conventional” MCF in (15), is:
(22)  .23
where:
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  For notational simplicity we write:24
.
  See Appendix A.2 for a detailed derivation of this “tax-revenue effect”.25
  See Appendix A.3 for the derivation of this expression.  It should be noted that: 26
.
  The workings are presented in Appendix A.4, together with the derivation of the27
structural form expression for .
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(23)  , is the tax inefficiency per dollar of notional
lump-sum transfer in the compensated equilibrium when tax  is raised marginally; it is
the compensated normalised MEB.24
Proof: Using the welfare equation in (4), and the transfer equation in (6), we can rewrite
the reduced form expression in (15), as:
(24)  .
Structural form expressions are required for the “profit” and “tax-revenue effects” in (24).
For the “tax-revenue effect” we have:
(25)  ,25
and for the “profit effect”:
(26)  .26
Once these structural form expressions in (25) and (26) are substituted into (24) we obtain
(22).27
This structural form expression for  in (22) is different to the expression obtained by
Sieper in Proposition 17 on pages 61-62.  We now prove that the expression obtained by
Sieper is for .
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  Using the welfare equation in (4) and the transfer equation in (6), the normalised 28
MEB is:
.
  This comes from: .  Since no relative prices29
change in the compensated equilibrium, we have .
  This is equation (5) in Sieper.30
  The workings are presented in Appendix A.5.31
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3.2  The “Corrected” Shadow Value of Government Revenue
Proposition 4:  A structural form expression for the “corrected” shadow value of
government revenue in (17), is:
(27)  .
Proof:  Using the welfare equation in (4), and the transfer equation in (6), we can write
the reduced form expression for  in (17), as:
(28)  .28
Two additional structural form expressions are required for the effects of the extra dollar
of government revenue in (28).  From Sieper, the “conventional” shadow value of
government revenue is:
(29)  ,
while the “profit effect” is:
(30)  ,29
with: ;30
Once the shadow price in (29), the “tax-revenue effect” in (25), and the “profit effects” in
(26) and (30), are substituted into (28) we obtain (27).31
Contrary to the claim made by Sieper in Proposition 17, it is clear from (22) and (27) that
.  Sieper appears to derive the structural form expression for in Proposition 17
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  This “corrected” compensated shadow price is Proposition 16 on page 56 in Sieper.32
  For notational simplicity we write: ,33
with  and .
  (34) comes from: , using (33) and34
.
  See Appendix A.6 for detailed workings.35
12
by exploiting the decomposition provided in (16), without realising  .
3.3  “Corrected” Shadow Prices
Proposition 5: A structural form expression for the uncompensated shadow price of any
good k, is:
(31)  ,
where:  with  and .32
Proof:  Using equations (4), (5), (6) and (8), we can rewrite the “corrected” shadow price
in (7), as:
(32)  .
Two additional structural form expressions are required in (32) for the partial derivatives
that arise from .  Following the approach used earlier, the “tax-revenue effect” is:
(33)  ,33
and the “profit effect” is:
(34)  ,34
where: , with  and .35
When the “tax-revenue effects” in (25) and (33), and the “profit effects” in (26) and (34),
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  See Appendix A.7 for detailed workings.36
  The dollar changes in utility are reliable measures of a welfare change when the37
marginal utility of income is constant, and this is the case for homothetic or quasi-linear
preferences.
  See Appendix A.8 for detailed workings.38
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are substituted into (32) we obtain (31).36
4.  Ramsey Optimal Taxation and the Marginal Excess Burden of Taxation
Sieper obtains Ramsey optimal taxes (on pages 48-49) by equating the uncompensated
marginal tax inefficiency per dollar change in government revenue on each tax for a given
revenue requirement i.e., equates their uncompensated normalised MEB.  This is difficult
to rationalise because we know that dollar changes in utility are, under general
circumstances, unreliable measures a welfare change.   For this reason we work with37
compensated measures of the tax inefficiency to minimise the social cost of raising the
required revenue.
It turns out, however, that when the uncompensated normalised MEB is equated across
distorting taxes they have the same compensated tax inefficiency per dollar change in
transfers i.e., the same compensated normalised MEB.  This follows from the fact that the
compensated and uncompensated measures of the normalised MEB are linked together by
the shadow value of government revenue.  We confirm this as:
Proposition 6:  The uncompensated normalised MEB for any tax h is equal to:
(35)  .
Proof: A reduced form expression for the normalised MEB in (8) is obtained using the
change in utility in (4), and the change in government revenue in (6), where:
(36)  .
Once the structural form expressions for the “tax-revenue effect” in (25), and the “profit
effect” in (26), are substituted into (36), we have:
(37)  .
This solves to (35) using the structural form expression for  in (27)38
It is clear from (35) that the “corrected” shadow value of government revenue links the
uncompensated and compensated normalised MEB’s for each tax in just the same way it
links the shadow prices for any good k in (16).  If we now take the ratio of the normalised
MEB’s for any two taxes h and m, we have:
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(38)  .
When the uncompensated marginal tax inefficiency per dollar change in government
revenue is the same for each tax (with ), the “corrected” shadow value of
government revenue in (17) is independent of the tax chosen, so . 
This is because each distorting tax converts a dollar of government budget surplus into the
same additional utility.  Consequently, each tax will have the same compensated tax
inefficiency per dollar change in compensating transfers (with ), and this is
confirmed by (38).
This extends the result obtained by Sieper that the ratio of the uncompensated shadow
prices for any two goods is equal to the ratio of their compensated shadow prices. And it
means that we can work with welfare changes obtained in full equilibrium models to
correctly evaluate public sector projects.  Any income effects that link together the
compensated and uncompensated welfare changes are independent of the goods chosen
when taxes are Ramsey optimal.
5.  Conclusion
A distinction is made in this paper between the “conventional” MCF and “corrected”
shadow value of government revenue.  The latter of these measures the rate that dollars of
compensated government budget surplus raise private utility when the budget is balanced
with distorting taxes; it therefore converts the compensated shadow price of any good into
its uncompensated shadow price.  In contrast, the “conventional” MCF is the change in
utility on dollars transferred from the government to consumers; it does not measure the
change in utility from an extra dollar of revenue.  By not distinguishing between  and
, Sieper obtains a reduced form expression that is inconsistent with the structural
form expression derived later in the paper.  The differences are summarised in the
following table, where the shaded cells are the expressions obtained by Sieper.  Clearly,
we cannot have .
As is to be expected, the “conventional” MCF will be unity when there is a non-distorting
tax (with ), so  collapses to , and the “corrected” shadow price of
every good collapses to its “conventional” lump-sum shadow price.
Reduced Form Structural Form
15
Finally, we proved that Ramsey optimal taxes have the same uncompensated MEB per
dollar change in government revenue.  This therefore makes it possible for policy makers
to set Ramsey optimal taxes using welfare measures obtained in full equilibrium models.
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ti > 0 consumption tax on i  T.
We omit quota-protected traded goods to simplify the analysis.  Also, we assume there is39
a single consumer; this is in essence what Sieper does by assuming “a dollar as a dollar” for each
consumer.
When there are h consumers we have the social welfare function W=W(U(c)), where40
U(c) is the vector of the h consumer utilities.  Thus:
.
From private sector utility maximisation we have: , where this allows the change
in social welfare above to be written as:
,   when     for all h (i.e., “ a dollar is a dollar”).
  Thus, n = H + T.  We assume all home goods are non-traded (NT), with H = NT; their41
are no quota restricted traded goods (QT), so all traded goods are fully traded T = FT.
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Appendix
A.1:  The model and notation that follows is taken from Sieper (1981) with slight
modifications.   A single consumer maximises U(c), where c is the vector of n goods.  39 40
There are H home goods whose prices are determined by domestic demands and supplies,
and T fully-traded goods whose prices are determined in world markets (as a small open
economy).41
The private (sector) budget constraint is:
with:
E - expenditure
q - the vector of consumer prices;
p - the vector of producer prices;
y - the vector of private net-outputs;
e - the vector of primary factor endowments (which are non-traded); and,
L - the lump-sum transfers received from the government.
The term py captures the profits which consumers receive as owners of private firms,
where
the outputs are produced subject to the following technological constraint:
.
The distorting taxes (and subsidies) are set in specific terms, where:
This allows us to write the tax revenue collected by the government, as:
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  We use the fact that: , and  for all .42
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.
By rearranging the private sector budget constraint, we have:
.
After totally differentiating this, and adding and subtracting , we obtain:
.
From the first order conditions for consumers we have: .  Where
 we can write this as: , and from the first order
conditions for firms: .  Using these first order conditions and the fact that
 for home goods, and  and  for traded goods, the change in
transfers becomes:
.
Once the market clearing conditions are applied, we have:
,
which is rearranged as (1).
The public sector budget constraint is:
,
where  is the vector of public sector net outputs, and  the profits from public
production.  After rearranging this we obtain the government budget surplus:
.
When this is totally differentiated we obtain equation (2).  The change in tax revenue in
equation (3) is obtained by totally differentiating tax revenue R above.
A.2:  The “tax-revenue effect” is obtained from (3) by using the functions for private
consumption demand, , and supply, , where:42
(39)  
The partial change in expenditure in (39) is:
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  Using the public sector budget constraint we can write private expenditure as:43
.
Using  and , we can rewrite it as:
,
where the change in private expenditure becomes:
.
From the market clearing conditions we have: , and from the competitive FOC’s
for firms: pdy = 0.  Also, since the endowments are fixed: pde = 0.
  Following Sieper we have: 44
   is the impact on the budget surplus45
of a unit rise in real private spending.
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(40)  ,43
and the equilibrium price changes solve the following system of equations:
(41)   ,
where:
(42)  ,
with:  and , , and .44
After substituting the expenditure change in (40), and the price changes in (42), into (39),
and applying the Slutsky decomposition, the “tax-revenue effect” becomes:45
(43)  
which simplifies to (25).
A.3:  The structural form expression for the “profit effect” in (26) is obtained by using the
equilibrium price changes in (42), together with the “tax-revenue effect” in (25).
A.4:  When the structural form expressions for the “tax-revenue effect” in (25) and the
“profit effect” in (26) are substituted into (24), we have:
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(44)  .
After dividing the numerator and denominator in (44) by , this becomes:
(45)  ,
which solves to (22) using the structural form expression for the compensated normalised
MEB in (23).  This normalised MEB is obtained using the compensated welfare equation:
(46)  ,
and the transfer equation:
(47)  ,
where:
(48)  .
This solves to the structural form expression in (23), using (26), where:
 .
A.5  When (25), (26), (29) and (30), are substituted into (28), we have:
(49)  .
After dividing the numerator and denominator in (49) by , this becomes:
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(50)  ,
which solves to (27) using the structural form expression for the normalised MEB in (23).
A.6: The equilibrium price changes solve the following system of equations:
(51)   ,
where the change in expenditure is equal to:
(52)  ,
with  and .
When (52) is substituted into (51), we obtain (34) by using (33) and the Slutsky
decomposition.
A.7:  After substituting the structural form expressions in (25), (26), (33) and (34) into
(32), we obtain:
(53)  .
When the numerator and denominator in (53) are divided by: , we have:
(54)  .
Equation (31) is obtained using the structural form expressions for the compensated
normalised MEB in (23) and the “corrected” shadow price in (27).
A.8:  When we substitute the structural form expressions in (25) and (26) into (36), the
uncompensated normalised MEB becomes:
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(55)  .
After manipulating (55), we have:
(56)  ,
which simplifies to:
(57)  .
We obtain the structural form expression for  in (37) by using (23).
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